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In Tony Kushner’s (2003) play, Only We Who Guard the Mystery Shall Be Unhappy, 
there are three main characters: An angel, Laura Bush and a silent group of Iraqi children. 
They are sitting in a circle around Laura, who is there to promote the importance of 
education and freedom. The angel, standing behind the group, politely attempts to make 
the First Lady aware that the children are dead. They were killed by US forces. Laura 
wonders why the children are in pyjamas and is informed by the angel that dead children 
wear pyjamas.  
 
So you are the first Iraqi children I’ve met and you look real sweet in your PJs. And 
I am sorry you’re dead, but all children love books. [ …] That’s why I have come – 
to read to you, to share one of my favorite books with you because when a parent 
reads to the child, or any adult reads to a child, even if that child is dead, the child 
will learn to love books, and that is so, so important. (Kushner, 2003) 
 
The First Lady learns how the children died, under what dreadful circumstances because 
of US bombing. Laura responds that Saddam Hussein is a terrible man:  
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It isn’t right that you should have had to die because your country is run by an evil 
man […] he will kill many, many other children all over the world if he isn’t 
stopped. So, so it was, um, necessary for you to die, sweetie, oh how awful to say 
that […] (Kushner, 2003) 
 
An allegory? A parody? Pure fiction with no references to ourselves or our political 
leaders as potential characters in the play? Reading this play such questions came to our 
mind: we began wondering what kind of war stories are told by female political leaders 
of our home countries, Norway and Finland. We have three main aims in this article. 
First, we seek to show how difficult it is talk about war without co-opting the hegemonic 
war rhetoric. Second, we examine how gender awareness is co-opted in the Western 
rhetoric of liberation. Third, we explore the rhetorical tools that are used for co-optation.  
 
Co-optation is a common discursive, rhetorical and linguistic practice that absorbs and 
neutralises the meanings of the original concepts to fit into the prevailing political 
priorities. Co-opting of the hegemonic war narrative takes place when the hegemonic 
ideology on war is not questioned and alternative war stories are rendered silent. Also 
gendered concepts can be co-opted and mixed with the hegemonic war rhetoric. 
Gendered concepts may easily be used in ways not corresponding to the original goals of 
those who formulated the ideas. Because concepts, such as gender equality, allow for 
multiple conflicting interpretations, a space is created for rhetoric, including empty 
declarations. (see also Stratigaki, 2005) Co-opting creates a doxic room that includes 
large areas of silences. For Pierre Bourdieu (1979), the doxic room is a room whose 
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doors are never opened. It indicates ‘thoughts which are thought through’. The term 
originates from the Greek doxa that denotes the non-political or non-discussable. The 
heterodox (different dogmas), on the other hand, is something that opens for genuine 
discussions where different opinions can be legitimate.  
 
Our narrative is influenced by feminist rhetorics as well as post-positivist and feminist 
studies in International Relations (IR) where these authors belong. The study of feminist 
rhetorics is seldom brought into the discipline of IR, and one of our aims is to examine 
what can be extracted from political rhetorics using this tool.  In order to show how 
difficult it is to avoid the hegemonic war rhetoric and how easy to mix the hegemonic 
war narrative with gender awareness, we examine the rhetorical means used as vehicles 
to  transport the hegemonic discourse into a war rhetoric that seeks to take distance from 
the hegemonic narrative. We demonstrate how rhetorical co-optation is done through 
ideographs, as they offer a subtle means for transporting ideological commitments. 
Ideographs may look like ordinary-language terms found in political discourse. Although 
they may seem to be ordinary-language terms, they are high order abstractions that form 
the basic linguistic and structural elements of ideology. They represent collective 
commitment to a particular but ambiguous normative goal, and also justify and legitimate 
action conducted in the name of the public. Ideographs do offer possibilities for change 
and contestation when a critical reading is directed at them. (on ideographs see McGee, 
1980) In addition to ideographs, our study reveals that the employment of panegyrics, 
that is, a formal public speech or written verse delivered in praise of a person or thing and 
the use of ‘gender-neutral’ rhetorics are the means of co-optation. 
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We have contrasted Norway and Finland with the USA, and particularly with Laura 
Bush’s feminism and rhetoric, to point out differences and similarities in feminisms and 
their rhetorics of war and also to discuss the ways the hegemonic war rhetoric is co-opted 
despite different feminist and foreign policy traditions. In Norway and Finland, the strong 
liberal and equity tradition of feminism could open up heterodox spaces for thinking 
about war and gender differently than in the USA. The First Lady had to balance between 
a neo-conservative and a liberal co-opted feminist rhetoric, while the Nordic politicians 
had to reach a liberal Norwegian and Finnish public. In our focus are, thus, the various 
war stories told by powerful Western women about Afghanistan in particular, but also 
about the role of women in peace-building as represented in UN Resolution 1325 on 
Women, Peace and Security. The Afghan war is important, in our view, since it came as a 
package containing the celebration of ’our’ neo-liberalism, modernity as well as the 
liberation of Muslim women from ’their brown men’ (Spivak, 1988) as a part of the 
ongoing civilizing mission of the West.  
 
The article contains four parts. It starts with a rhetorical presentation of silence, or the 
rhetoric of silence as we call it. This will serve as a theoretical point of entry to the three 
following parts. First we will give the voice to the US First Lady, Laura Bush. Since all 
rhetoric is contextual, it is vital also to examine the cultures within which the rhetoric 
works. Thereby, we locate the Nordic female politicians’ rhetoric in the foreign policy 
and feminist traditions of Norway and Finland. Then we give voice to two Norwegians 
and one Finn, three powerful women who all focus on Afghan women and apply feminist 
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rhetoric, albeit somewhat differently, in their war stories. The selected Nordic women 
have advanced feminist agendas in a variety of forums in many instances and feminism 
also underpins their war rhetorics. The rhetoric of the neo-conservative First Lady tells us 
something about one aspect of feminist discourse, while the rhetoric of three liberal 
Nordic feminist politicians tells us about another aspect, namely about Western liberal 
and political feminism and its means of co-optation. In our conclusions we create a 
heterodoxic room and give voice to an Afghan woman. Hers is the voice the Nordic 
women would so desperately like to hear, but hers is also the unsettling message that 
renders her silent. 
 
 
Rhetoric of gendered silence 
 
Feminist rhetoric is a vague concept and is understood differently by different scholars. 
Some scholars within feminist rhetorical studies have sought to transform the rhetorical 
tradition from what is seen as upper-class, agonistic, public, and male into regendered, 
inclusionary, dialogic and collaborative rhetoric. (Ballif, 1992; Bizzell and Herzberg, 
1990) Within the tradition of feminist rhetoric we use the notion of ‘rhetorics of silence’ 
that establishes a link between the co-optation of ideographs and silence, namely, what is 
silenced and left untouched when the co-opted ideographs are at work. The rhetoric of 
silence, as it is understood here, challenges the dichotomous perspectives that assert the 
binaries of male-agonistic/female-dialogic. (see Campbell, 1989; Jarrat, 1991; Cloud, 
1998; Lippe von der, 2003 and 2007) 
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A rhetoric of silence may seem peculiar, given the Western tendency to overvalue speech 
and speaking out, as Cheryl Glenn (2002) writes. Within the rhetorical tradition, the focus 
is mainly on who is seen and what is read or heard. Most often it seems as the speaker of 
interest is the one who decides when it is time to talk and time to be silent. It is thus 
mainly about successful and not successful rhetoric from the perspective of the powerful.  
We use the expression ’gendered silence of rhetoric’ for the traditional gender blind 
rhetoric. At the latent and ideological level, the traditional perspective implies embedded 
masculinism; a masculinism from above devoid of any awareness of gender, class, 
ethnicity or race. What is not heard, read or seen is often more rhetoric than what is 
heard, read or seen. We argue that there are indeed many silences, particularly in war 
rhetoric. We concur with Glenn (2002:4) who writes: ‘Just as we use words to obfuscate 
meaning or to buy time, we use silence, sometimes productively, sometimes not – just as 
we use speech’.  
 
The question is not only whether speech or silence is the most productive, effective or 
appropriate. Rather, the question is about a rhetoricity of purposeful silence when it is 
self-selected or when it is imposed.  
 
When silence is our rhetorical choice, we can use it purposefully and productively 
— but when it is not our choice, but someone else’s for us, it can be insidious, 
particularly when someone else’s choice for us comes in the shape of institutional 
structure. To wit, a person can choose silence, but the choice isn’t really hers 
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because speaking out will be professional suicide. In short, she’s been disciplined 
— and silenced. (Glenn, 2002: 5)  
 
When silence is imposed on us, it may be a question of life and death. Silence may be a 
means for survival or a conscious way of resistance. When silence is not chosen and thus 
broken but there is nobody to listen, one’s value as human seems to be nil. As Jacqueline 
Jones Royster puts it: ‘What I am compelled to ask when veils seem more like walls, is 
who has the privilege of speaking?’ (Royster, 1996: 36). Who has, claims or is granted 
this privilege, is of course much more than a question about gender, it is also more than a 
question about ethnicity, religion and class. It is about all of these factors, and it is about 
power, too. 
 
The authority of the dominant group and its silences are not always imposed by force on 
individuals, but offered to them in subtle ways. What is offered for consideration is not 
just an assertion of another value or a set of values. The twist is that hegemonic 
discourses, according to Antonio Gramsci (1978), are offered as something you already 
agree with, as a reflection of your own desires, needs and wants, and in which you can 
effortlessly recognize yourself. Hegemony thus seems to offer what you already want 
anyway. This kind of hegemony shortly after September 11 was not threatened in 
Western countries, and together with the gendered rhetoric of protecting and liberating 
Afghan Muslim women (and children) included, was an eminently suitable rhetoric for 
the hegemonic discourse, but less compatible with the discourses, practices and 
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experiences of most Afghan women. The authority in this case has been forcibly 
imposed. It is not offered to Afghan (men or) women in any subtle ways.  
 
 
Feminism and metamorphosis  
 
War rhetoric, and its use of ideographs, occurs within particular historical moments in 
which soft or less soft feminism can be mixed with the hegemonic war rhetoric and used 
strategically to justify and legitimate foreign policy action. In the USA there were several 
female politicians deploring women’s conditions under Taliban rule in autumn 2001. 
There were, for example, Condolezza Rice, a hard-line Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria 
Clarke and a chief political advisor to Dick Cheney, Mary Matalin. Among those highly 
influential women was the First Lady, Laura Bush, experiencing a metamorphosis shortly 
after September 11. She suddenly appeared in public as a newsworthy political 
spokeswoman – and consoler-in-chief – on national security and international issues.  
 
Inspired by Tasha Dubriwny (2005) as well as by S. Parry-Giles and D.M. Blair (2002), 
we approach Laura Bush’s speech made at an USAID event with President Hamid 
Karzai. The speech serves as an illustration of her balancing between 
neoconservative/maternal and liberal/modern feminist rhetoric. 
 
Today, we continue to speak out on behalf of women and children, especially girls, 
who for 7 years have been denied their basic human rights of health and education. 
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Thanks to the efforts of the international community, the days of oppression and 
terror by the Taliban are becoming a memory. However, we must never forget the 
atrocities that took place at the hands of the Taliban. We will not forget that 70 
percent of Afghans were malnourished. […] Thanks to the international coalition 
those days are over. The rights and dignity of women and children are once again a 
priority for the government of Afghanistan. (Laura Bush, 29 January 2002) 
 
The all embracing maternal ‘we’ is strengthened and the agents are first and foremost ‘the 
international community’ and ‘international coalition’ on whose behalf she speaks, as she 
in fact is speaking on behalf of and instead of Afghan women. Upholding the saving of 
Afghan women and children as an ideograph – be it Afghan or US women (and children), 
with similar rhetorical dimensions as a building block in the ‘international community’ – 
she takes no risks and provokes few.  
 
Laura Bush is, as Dubriwny (2005: 89-100) so vividly describes it, drawing upon the 
traditions of the republican mother pulpit and crafting an argument for women’s rights 
that upholds a traditional understanding of womanhood as well as balancing on a 
tightrope between the modern binary private/public dichotomy and a liberal feminist 
rhetoric. <Women-and-children> (for ‘womenandchildren’ see Enloe, 1990 and 1996) 
functions in much the same way as abstractions like ‘equality’, ‘democracy’, ‘modernity’ 
and ‘liberty’, despite the materiality of both women and children. According to 
Dubriwny, this indicates the importance of recognizing the ability of material concepts to 
act as ideology in certain types of discourse. Although ideographs are culture bound, 
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meaning different things in different cultures some, as <women-and-children>, do, 
however, appeal to common values all over the world at least to some extent. This 
indicates an acknowledgment of the blurring lines between words referring literally to the 
concrete material world and abstractions. 
 
<Women-and-children> derives its meaning from its specific applications, and it works 
to support visions essential to rallying wartime nationalism and to presenting citizens 
with a sense of their nation’s special benevolence. Laura Bush chooses a combination of 
domesticity and maternal values with independence and access to the public sphere. This 
demonstrates at least some erosion of the public/private dichotomy. Her acts of social 
politicking are mainly practised on topics related to women and children. While the First 
Lady had to balance between a neo-conservative and a liberal co-opted feminist rhetoric, 
Norwegian and Finnish female representatives of the power elite were dancing on a 
different tightrope: They had to reach a fairly liberal Norwegian and Finnish public 
characterized by equity feminism, i.e. a feminism focused on incorporating women into 
existing male dominated (market)liberalist ideology. At the same time, they had to avoid 
too close identification with both the US president, ’the commander in chief’, and ’the 
consoler-in-chief’, Laura Bush. In order to contextualize the rhetorics of the Nordic 
female politicians and contrast it with Laura Bush’s rhetoric and feminism, we will 
briefly examine the Norwegian and Finnish feminist and foreign policy traditions.  
 
 
Equalities and (non)alliances 
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Instead of maternal feminism, Nordic feminism is largely characterized by equity 
feminism. In Norway and Finland, a traditional, but liberal, social-democratic ethos with 
a heterosexual nuclear family as its focus dominates feminist thinking. Women are seen 
to be inherently similar to men, and gender equality has been the driving force for the 
feminist movement in both countries. Male dominance and power have been criticized 
and one of the goals has been women’s equal participation in the domestic political 
sphere. In Norway and Finland, the state ideology is that of a welfare state with strong 
labour unions and labour parties, and official feminism coincides with that ideology. 
(Brandth and Moxnes, 1996; Haviland and Magnusson, 2005: 227-235; Holli and 
Kantola, 2007; Jónasdóttir and von der Fehr, 1998: 1-20; Teigen and Skjeie, 2003) 
 
However, the tradition is not without its fissures. The dominant Norwegian gender 
equality policy is also called a ’balance equality’ because of its focus on a 50/50 or 
sometimes 40/60 balanced relationship between women and men in power positions. 
Gender justice is mainly considered synonymous with this type of gender balance. It is 
the balance which is the main concern, and the question of equality with whom or with 
what (interests) is seldom raised. (Holst, 2007) The notion of women’s ’responsible 
rationality’ was also developed and used in Nordic feminism. Responsible rationality was 
pitted against men’s instrumental rationality. It was argued that neither instrumental nor 
value rationality capture the specific women’s approach to situations of conflicts of 
interest. Women have a tendency to identify with those in need of care, and thereby, 
develop responsible rationality. Women’s everyday experiences drive them towards care 
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that is a rationally developed standpoint rather than an emotional reaction. (Ve, 1998: 
326-327) In short, there is a trace of difference feminism in Nordic feminism, although 
the official feminist ideology is strongly geared towards gender equality. We argue that 
the Nordic responsible rationality can take the form of ’patronizing rationality’ when it 
seeks to save ’brown women from brown men’.  
 
What the foreign policy rhetorics of Norway and Finland have in common is the story of 
remote geographical positions which, according to the hegemonic narratives, have 
historically permitted these states to remain aloof from international engagement. The 
decision to enter into military alliances was taken a post-Second World War, i.e. with 
Norway’s NATO membership in 1949. Neutrality and non-alignment were preferred 
foreign policy doctrines in Finland. Ideologically, the links between Norwegian foreign 
policy and NATO and the USA have been strong. Despite these differences, Norway and 
Finland have focused less on the East /West dichotomy and more on humanitarian 
principles, peace, cooperation and disarmament as well as the welfare state. <Solidarity>, 
<internationalism> and <multilateralism> have been the ideographs around which the 
Nordic foreign policy rhetoric has been established in the post-Cold War era and in 
whose name actions are performed. The foreign policy master narrative cherishes the idea 
that the Nordic countries have a longstanding tradition of participation in UN-led 
peacekeeping activities, conflict prevention through political dialogue, mediation and 
high levels of overseas development aid. (on the tradition see Bergman, 2004; 
Ingebritsen, 2002; Browning, 2002) 
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Finland did not engage in criticism in its official foreign policy rhetoric, for example, of 
oppressive regimes during the Cold War. Finnish neutrality was justified by arguing that 
it offered a way to stay out of the conflicts between the great powers. Finland was seen to 
be between East and West, and was therefore assumed to have a capacity for bridge-
building in international tensions. In the Finnish foreign policy rhetoric, Finland’s 
cautious policy towards the Soviet Union was rationalized by arguing that it was an 
expression of sheer pragmatism given Finland’s geopolitical position. (see e.g. Browning, 
2002: 47-72; Forsberg et al., 2003)  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland has 
emphasized its Westerness, its belonging to the ’Western European family’. This has 
allowed Finland to present itself as true moral actor in world politics.  
 
In Norway’s foreign policy tradition there is a long continuum of two different 
orientations, namely a view that emphasizes Norway’s geopolitical position and a view 
that lays stress on Norway’s global responsibility in matters concerning conflict 
prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. According to Olav Riste, 
there were three formative periods in the evolution of Norwegian foreign policy: ‘1905-
1910, when “classic” Norwegian neutralism took shape; the inter-war period, when 
Norway wrapped herself in the mantle of a missionary for international law and 
disarmament; and the 1940s during which the country allied itself with great powers and 
became an active participant in international power politics’ (Riste, 2001: 2; see also 
Leira and Neumann, 2007). As mentioned above, Norway’s NATO membership and its 
close alliance with the USA has shaped the rhetoric on security and defence issues, and 
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’Atlantism’ was widely accepted as the main way of framing Norway’s position. (Riste, 
2001) 
 
The Norwegian foreign policy rhetoric was re-shaped after the break-down of the Cold 
War international system. The tendency to emphasize Norway’s ’ethical foreign policy’ 
strengthened. Norway now perceives itself as a ’humanitarian great power’ and a ’player 
in international efforts for peace and security’. For example, Foreign Minister Knut 
Vollebæk (1998) stated that Norway’s participation in peacekeeping operations and 
international crisis management is an integral part of Norway’s foreign and security 
policy. In security policy terms, Norway wants to contribute to ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ in 
the world, and sees itself as having a fundamental moral obligation to promote human 
rights and peace globally. Thus, humanitarian considerations are also claimed to guide 
the country’s foreign policy. In official rhetoric, Norway does not take part in any war; 
taking part in military operations is the closest to an explicit war states the official foreign 
policy rhetoric in Norway. 
 
Finland has participated in the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan since 2002 and 
the Finnish participation consists of both military and civilian elements. In the official 
foreign policy rhetoric, the role of the international community is emphasized and it is 
seen to provide security for a state that is not yet capable of governing itself. Afghanistan 
is seen as a ‘failed state’ where the help of the international community is vital for its 
reconstruction (Afghanistan Report 2007: 10;  Tarja Halonen, 3 April 2008; Ilkka 
Kanerva, 22 January 2008; Erkki Tuomioja, 18 January 2002) Finland’s official rhetoric 
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on Afghanistan relies heavily on such ideographs as <peace>, <assisted reconstruction>  
and <international community>. These are offered as something every Finnish citizen 
should readily agree with without creating room for heterodox to emerge. The cause of 
the war is not the US intervention in the name of the ’war on terror’, but the inability of 
Afghanistan to maintain its own structures of governance.  
 
Norway also participates in the ISAF operation. The Norwegian foreign policy rhetoric is 
lavish in its use of metonyms with reference to Afghanistan. For example, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre urges Afghanistan to get ‘back on its feet’ (Jonas Gahr 
Støre, 11 June 2008). The situation is seen to be ‘vulnerable’ (Jonas Gahr Støre, 18 
October 2008). Given the ‘vulnerability’ and ‘falling of a state’, the role of the 
international community, where ‘Norway will take its share of responsibility’ (Jonas 
Gahr Støre, 9 October 2005), in assisting the country is emphasized. In short, 
<international solidarity> and <peacemaker> are the principal ideographs on which the 
Norwegian’s rhetoric on Afghanistan is based.  
 
Despite both Norway’s and Finland’s foreign policy rhetoric about the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts, humanitarian principles and moral obligations, the military (and 
civilian) engagement in the ISAF operation was not questioned. Neither did the liberal 
and equity feminist tradition in these countries create heterodox for female politicians 
that would allow a true polyphony on the reasoning of countries’ foreign policy towards 
Afghanistan and unspoken silences to be spoken. Rather, a co-optation took place when 
Norwegian and Finnish female politicians appropriated at the very early stage of the 
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intervention in Afghanistan the Western hegemonic discourse on the war. The co-
optation operated in three four ways. First, the ideograph <women-and-children> was 
often evoked and added to the dominant foreign policy rhetoric without questioning the 
actual rhetorical work it does to support the hegemonic narratives and ideology 
underlying them. Second, the hegemonic war narrative was mixed with gender 
awareness. Third, sometimes gender-neutral rhetoric was used to hail into being a 
collective and unitary Western do-gooder identity and, at the same time, to disassociate 
Nordic involvement from the US ’war on terror’ and silence its consequences. Third, the 
panegyric of UN Resolution 1325 facilitated the metamorphosis of the militaristic and 
masculine US-led NATO into a collective peacekeeper that can ‘save brown women from 
brown men’.   
 
 
Liberal Norwegian and Finnish co-optation 
 
The Norwegian social democrat and leader of the governmental defence committee from 
2002 to 2005, Marit Nybakk, has for several years been the most important spokes person 
for Norwegian co-opted feminist rhetoric. She begins many of her articles (and speeches) 
as follows:  
 
Here in the West we have closed our eyes to the brutal treatment of Afghan women 
because the injustice did not strike at ourselves. Then we experienced September 
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11th and the US-led war to fight against Taliban and the terror network al-Qaida. 
This is indeed a necessary war. (Nybakk, 2002) 
 
The interpellation of all people in the West, an all-embracing non-gendered ‘we’, is 
characteristic of Nybakk’s rhetoric; alluding both to religious rhetoric (‘[…] because it 
did not occur to ourselves/thou should love […]’) and to an important Norwegian author 
and poet, Arnulf Øverland and his poem ‘You shall not tolerate so terribly well the 
injustice that doesn’t strike at yourself […]’ (‘Du skal ikke tale så innerlig vel den urett 
som ikke rammer deg selv […]’) Elements of love for ‘the others’ as prescribed in the 
Bible and virile war rhetoric – ‘this is indeed a necessary war’ – is, however, indicative of 
some robust strength regardless of gender. Equality between women and men is a part of 
an ideographic building block within the Norwegian war-and-peace rhetoric. The Laura-
like overtly maternal rhetoric is here and also elsewhere absent from the Norwegian war 
rhetoric. The politicians’ positions as benevolent mothers vis-à-vis Afghan women, 
however, are manifestly present, not only in Laura Bush’s rhetoric, but in Nybakk’s 
rhetoric, too. The step from benevolent mother to patronizing rationality is a short one 
and easy to take.  
 
The omnipotent and gender-neutral ’we’ is also hailed into being by the President of 
Finland, Tarja Halonen, when she speaks about Afghanistan. For her, ‘the success of 
ISAF operation in Afghanistan is our common challenge’ since it contributed to security 
in Afghanistan (Tarja Halonen, 29 June 2004). Similarly, ‘the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan requires a long-standing commitment from the international community’. 
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(Tarja Halonen, 6 March 2008, see also 17 April 2008; 4 April 2008) The West/’we’ is a 
non-gendered actor, and yet, it is constituted vis-à-vis Afghani women. The ISAF 
operation has contributed to the ‘fact’ that President Karzai is now committed to 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights, including women’s and girls’ rights (Tarja 
Halonen, 29 June 2004). A positive and necessary connection between the intervention of 
the international community and the rights and welfare of Afghani women is established:  
 
During the Talibani regime women were denied schooling and working outside 
home – and even laughing out loud. Now the situation is better, yet it requires 
improvements. (Tarja Halonen, 6 March 2008).  
 
<Women-and-children> or <women-and-girls> work as ideographs that represent the 
collective commitment to save ’brown women from brown men’. Women’s welfare is in 
the hands of international community, which is capable of delivering women’s rights in 
the form of human rights. The ideographs excuse the shouting silences concerning the 
causes of the war in Afghanistan and the military side of NATO’s involvement. They 
also justify Finnish participation in an operation led by a military organization. The Laura 
Bush type of maternal feminist discourse does not occur in Halonen’s rhetoric. The 
liberal feminist tradition takes over in the form of women’s equal rights.  
 
As the freedom promised by Operation Enduring Freedom and the supportive ISAF 
seemed difficult to reach, the rhetoric of the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne-Grete 
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Strøm-Erichsen, gets new dressing. In the article, Why do we send soldiers abroad, she 
writes:  
 
We who every day are working with foreign issues, we know why we are in 
Afghanistan. For us it is thus easy to forget that it might not necessarily be so for 
others. (Strøm-Erichsen, 2007) 
 
Her ethos as a peacemaker is threatened and she has to stand up as one-who-knows-
better-than-others, i.e. docere, which, however, seldom is the way to success. Strøm-
Erichsen continuously reminds us that ‘[…] we take part, not in war, but in military 
engagement’, because ‘we want to contribute to peace and conflict resolution’. This is, 
she continues, ‘a moral duty and a natural part of our tradition of peace-building and 
stabilization in the world. Norway’s aim is to prevent weapons of mass destruction from 
coming into the hands of terrorists’ (Strøm-Erichsen, 2007). The humanitarian rhetoric, 
the rhetoric of democracy and freedom, is the red-cross thread, running together with 
traditional gender-neutral or gender blind rhetoric. Marginalization of the feminist 
rhetoric is used at this stage since hearts and minds after years of warfare are difficult to 
reach by such interpellation. 
 
In rhetoric antonyms often become synonyms: the transformation of peace into war – 
peace means war and war means peace – is common and nearly classic in all war 
rhetorics. Norwegian peace rhetoric persists despite a non-traditional Norwegian foreign 
policy, i.e. NATO’s and Norway’s out-of-area warfare. ‘Together with 25 other members 
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of NATO Norway has promised to take part in security and peace-building in 
Afghanistan. Thereby we will also strengthen our common freedom, culture and 
civilization’, Strøm-Erichsen (2007) also tells us in her article. Her eulogy, i.e. praise, is 
thus not only pointing to Norway and to NATO, but to Western culture and civilization as 
such. With this rhetorical maneouver, she is able to include the US without explicitly 
including the super- or hyperpower in her panegyric of ’our engagement’. The invisibility 
of Afghan women is compensated by an increased focus on NATO; a NATO that is 
apparently independent of the USA. In a similar vein, President Halonen, during the visit 
of the Norwegian royal family to Finland, praised Norway and its peace-building work in 
Afghanistan. In her eulogy, ‘both Norway and Finland offer to the international 
community help in its work on conflict prevention and resolution’ (Tarja Halonen, 5 June 
2007).  Through these ‘gender-neutral’ rhetorical moves the unity of commitment in 
Afghanistan and its moral grounding is produced. There is no need to question the origins 
of the war and its possible connections to the US ’war on terror’ since the whole 
’international community’ stands for good causes.  
 
Rhetorical practices are, as Kenneth Burke (1950) argues, activities concerning identities. 
In Norwegian and Finnish war rhetoric this is of utmost importance, too. For rhetoric to 
be successful, the audiences must feel that their autonomy is upheld and that they can 
simultaneously experience identification with the rhetorical interpellation. Identification 
is about being equal and different, unified and separated. Identification with the USA and 
its foreign policy is difficult to establish with George W. Bush in power. Identification 
with NATO, ISAF and the UN, on the other hand, is strong. Norwegian and Finnish 
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politicians of both genders are taking part in a rhetorical tightrope balancing that is 
different from what is taking place in the USA. Never big enough to be colonial powers 
and never big enough to initiate a war, Norway and Finland are in this identity story 
’peace-building’ countries per se. 
 
In President Halonen’s speeches, the ideograph <voice> does the rhetorical work of 
suggesting that there is a single and coherent subaltern woman whose voice the 
international community can hail into being and hear. She claims that ‘by taking into 
account women’s experiences and by hearing the voice of women’ women can participate 
in peace-building in Afghanistan’ (Tarja Halonen, 6 March 2006; cf. 18 February 2008). 
Abstract ’local women’ is constituted as a speaking subject with whom particularly the 
female peacekeepers representing the international community can communicate. (see 
Tarja Halonen, 6 March 2008; 19 September 2008) Women have a shared voice and 
mystical communication channel among themselves. The channel is not created among 
equals in power, but owes its existence to the fact that women ‘maintain everyday life’ 
and ‘are responsible for the wellbeing of families’ (Tarja Halonen, 4 March 2008).  This 
happens during armed conflicts, but there is no doubt that the female personnel on 
military operations knows intimately the burden of ’maintaining everyday life’ and 
’being responsible for the wellbeing of families’ while taking part in the operation. 
Equity feminism here becomes reminiscent of difference feminism and responsible 
rationality when women’s special capacities in private arenas are established as sources 
for the expansion of women’s responsibilities into the public sphere.    
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Strøm-Erichsen’s speech in Brussels 2006 to the European Union members on security 
issues serves as an illustration of promoting self-evident truths within an apparently 
harmonious security discourse. Having assured the members of the Norwegian support to 
NATO (and the EU), she pays specific attention to the war in Afghanistan:  
 
First, the international community must coordinate civilian efforts in a better way. 
Today the civilian aspects of our engagements, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, are 
often fragmented and uncoordinated. This means that the overall results are less 
effective. (Strøm-Erichsen, 2006) 
 
Catastrophes for Afghan civilians are presented as insufficient coordination of ‘civilian 
efforts’; they are simply a coordination problem and the problem is ‘gender-neutral’. The 
war in Afghanistan thus seems to be a logistic question rather than a military occupation 
as such. ‘Second’, she continues, ‘development cannot take place without the necessary 
level of security. There needs to be close cooperation between NATO, the EU and the 
UN, as well as with other international actors, including NGO’s’ (Strøm-Erichsen, 2006). 
 
Here the harmonious unity between opposing organizations is taken for granted, and 
gender is not an issue. The same organizational harmony is then elevated to include the 
World Bank:  
 
[…] informal consultations on Afghanistan held this month between senior 
representatives from NATO, the UN, the EU, the World Bank, is an excellent 
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initiative to co-ordinate the international community’s efforts to support 
reconstruction and development in Afghanistan. (Strøm-Erichsen, 2006) 
 
Magic harmony seems to exist; ‘gender-neutral’ organizations of all categories ought 
simply to co-ordinate their efforts. Strøm-Erichsen concludes by praising the EU decision 
to promote ‘gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management, in line with 
UN Resolution 1325.  This is important progress. Norway puts great emphasis on the UN 
resolution and has adopted a national action plan to promote gender issues.’ (Strøm-
Erichsen, 2006) The harmony is at last established as she urges the EU members to 
conform with Norway and the UN Resolution. The original goal, i.e. women as true 
participants in conflict and peace processes, is easily obscured, if not fully abandoned. 
Strøm-Erichsen accommodates with military-strategic priorities and concepts, and gender 
equality becomes co-opted to fit into this frame.  
 
In sum, feminist potential inherent in the UN resolution and in the original feminist 
discourse underlying it is co-opted to fit into existing political priorities in both Strøm-
Erichsen’s and Halonen’s rhetorics. Metamorphosis thus occurs at different levels, in 
different contexts and by different means. NATO also seems to have undergone some 
kind of metamorphosis and has become an organization for peace-building that is 
independent of the USA. The gender mainstreaming is so main-streamed that the UN 
Resolution easily fits into most war stories no matter what is referred to (see also 
Väyrynen, 2004). This is another aspect of the rhetorical metamorphosis. Rhetorical 
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flexibility may indicate both openness and ambivalence or it is a rhetorical strategy for 
constructing war stories as facts.  
 
The similarity in the rhetoric of the three Nordic female politicians is to be found in their 
promotion of benevolent philanthropy, be it a rhetoric explicitly dressed in feminist guise 
or without such dressing(s). The common benevolent philanthropy indicates, however, 
that it is often easier to identify with oppressed women than with strong and potent 
women – women who also might be in need of support, support based, however, on 
solidarity as equals. Potent Afghan women speaking themselves about needs and 
aspirations based on their own experiences might have raised problems for the 
humanitarian rhetoric of feminist co-optation. Enloe`s (1996; see also Enloe, 2004) 
scenario of ‘womenandchildren-protected-by-statesmen’ may indeed be paraphrased by 





The ideographic abstractions so common in foreign policy rhetoric refer to a world with 
little resemblance to the real world. The imaginative geography embedded in various 
mediated protection scenarios ought, in our view, to be challenged. In the real world the 
relation between protector and protected is often experienced as a relation between 
oppressors with no-body really protected (see also Stiehm, 1982). Our narrative about 
gendered war rhetoric sheds some light on what is at stake at the global level when 
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gender awareness is included, an awareness so easily co-opted in the Western rhetoric of 
liberation. Who has the privilege of speaking ‘when veils seem more like walls’, as 
Royster puts it, is an issue more important than the veiling of bodies.  
 
The rhetoric of gendered silence has for most Afghan women been a chosen silence in 
public. It is a silence primarily based on a choice to survive or not to survive. The choice 
was not taken due to the absence of needs, to passivity or to indifference. Some Afghan 
women have, however, risked their lives and for decades cried out asking the world, the 
international community, to listen. Few heard their voices and even fewer listened. 
Gayatri C. Spivak’s (1988) essay Can the Subaltern Speak? is as relevant now as it was 
twenty years ago. In our view, the subaltern can often speak, but the question is ‘are we 
really listening and can we hear her?’ (see Väyrynen, 2010). We have demonstrated how 
that listening seems to be extremely difficult for those in power.  
 
When the subaltern speaks, it requires openness to her message from the part of the 
listener because it may be unsettling, something we do not want to hear. For example, 
Malalai Joya, Afghanistan’s youngest and most out-spoken parliamentarian, states:  
 
The US government removed the ultra-reactionary and brutal regime of Taliban, but 
instead of relying on the Afghan people, pushed us from the frying pan into the fire 
and selected its friends from among the most dirty and infamous criminals of the 
‘Northern Alliance’, which is made up of the sworn enemies of democracy and 
human rights, and are as dark-minded, evil, and cruel as the Taliban. The Western 
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media talks about democracy and the liberation of Afghanistan, but the US and its 
allies are engaged in the warlordization, criminalization and drug-lordization of our 
wounded land. Today the Northern alliance leaders are the key power holders and 
our people are hostage in the hands of these ruthless gangs of killers. Many of them 
are responsible for butchering tens of thousands of innocent people in the past 2 
decades but are in power and hold key positions in the government. (Malalai Joya, 
12 April 2007) 
Like other Afghan women and men opposing the war, she has not been worthy of being 
listened to from the Western perspective. Joya reminds us that the US/Western dominated 
war game is a fact and not a fiction, it is a war going on in concrete parts of the world, 
felt on the skins of concrete people and filled with an uncountable number of dead bodies 
without pyjamas. Seen, however, as fiction, we do not know how many characters are left 
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